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This article develops a constructive criticism of methodological conventionalism.
Methodological conventionalism asserts that standards of inductive risk ought to be
justified in virtue of their ability to facilitate coordination in a research community. On that
view, industry bias occurs when conventional methodological standards are violated to
foster industry preferences. The underlying account of scientific conventionality, however,
is insufficient for theoretical and practical reasons. Conventions may be justified in virtue of
their coordinative functions, but often qualify for posterior empirical criticism as research
advances. Accordingly, industry bias does not only threaten existing conventions but may
impede their empirically warranted improvement if they align with industry preferences. My
empiricist account of standards of inductive risk avoids such a problem by asserting that
conventional justification can be pragmatically warranted but has, in principle, only a
provisional status. Methodological conventions, therefore, should not only be defended
from preference-based infringements of their coordinative function but ought to be
subjected to empirical criticism.
Keywords: values in science, conventionalism, methodological conventions, inductive risk, randomized controlled
trials, industry bias
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, more than 68% of all R&D funding in the United Kingdom stemmed from private
donors (National Office of Statistics 2020), a number that still appears moderate when
compared to 76% in China and 78% in South-Korea (Eurostats 2019). As Bennett Holman
and Kevin Elliot rightly note in a recent meta-review, philosophers have overwhelmingly taken
this prevalence of industry funding to be worrisome. It has been argued recurrently that industry
funding causes epistemically detrimental “industry bias” across various fields of scientific
research (Holman and Elliott 2018, 2). Miriam Solomon, echoing the British Medical
Journal and Institute of Medicine, has recently warned that industry bias poses “the greatest
known systematic threat to the objectivity of medical research” (Lo and Field, 2009; Moynihan
et al., 2019; Solomon 2020, 439).
However, such strong normative claims require robust epistemological grounds. Surely,
industry funded research produces different results, i.e., such that are useful for the respective
industry actors. But for what reasons exactly are we holding these differences to be epistemically
detrimental? For external interests to qualify as epistemic threats, we ought to have strong
reasons that the epistemic standards of our research would be higher without them. The appeal
to any such standard, however, sits unwell with recent philosophical claims about the prevalence
of so-called inductive risks in various internal stages of scientific research. Inductive risk, for
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now, can be defined as the risk of “wrongly accepting or
rejecting a hypothesis on the basis of evidence” (Biddle
2016). Inductive-risk judgements, so the usual story goes,
are non-epistemic value judgements about research design,
conduct, and communication. If non-epistemic considerations
are so ubiquitous in scientific practice, how can we identify
epistemic (as opposed to ethical) standards on which “industry
bias” infringes?
Torsten Wilholt has developed a conventionalist solution to
this problem, which he later embedded in a position called
methodological conventionalism. For a methodological
conventionalist, conventional standards of inductive risk are
epistemically justified due to their ability of facilitating
coordination in a scientific community, thereby improving
the collective pursuit of knowledge. In other words, sharing
conventional methodologies, which implicitly determine
standards of inductive risk, is necessary for scientists to
engage in coordinated inquiry. Industry bias, on such an
account, may be described as the infringement of such
conventions for increasing the likelihood of a result
preferred by industry funders. Wilholt’s conventionalism
has received a warm reception in recent literature on
industry funded science and inductive risk.1
I will argue, however, that it faces two interlinked problems.
First, the conventionalist concept of bias is not able to account for
one of themost central epistemic flaws of industry funded research:
empirically ineffective conventions. On my reading, this practical
problem results from a second, theoretical weakness of Wilholt’s
position. The role of conventional justification in science is not
characterized sufficiently through appeals to coordination.
Although research methodologies can be justified in virtue of
their coordinative function, scientists should subject
conventional choices to posterior empirical criticism. Based on
this insight, I propose a permissive empiricism. For a permissive
empiricist, the conventional justification of standards of inductive
risk can be permitted in light of contextual constraints but is always
provisional, i.e., it ought to be substituted by empirical justification
at a later point of inquiry. My account thereby preserves Wilholt’s
notion of industry bias, while, permitting empirical criticism of
structural industry bias. The latter results from the institution or
perpetuation of empirically ineffective conventions that serve
industry interests.
The plan is as follows. First, I reconstruct Wilholt’s
conventionalist account of industry bias and its motivation in
the argument from inductive risk (AIR). Second, I review whether
his position, methodological conventionalism, is well motivated
in light of recent work on AIR. Third, I use the case of
pharmaceutical trials to show how methodological
conventionalists are unable to adequately assess structurally
flawed conventions. I close by proposing an empiricist account
of standards of inductive risks which preserves Wilholt’s
definition of bias while allowing for the empirical criticism of
flawed conventions.
WILHOLT ON INDUCTIVE RISK AND
INDUSTRY BIAS
“Industry bias,” roughly, describes epistemically detrimental
effects that industry preferences have on the conduct of
scientific research. However, as “bias” is certainly a polysemic
concept (Resnik 2000), it is necessary to distinguish between (at
least) two different senses in which it is used in recent
philosophical literature. In a broad sense, industry bias
subsumes all factors that increase the likelihood of research
to produce results preferable to its industry funders. As such,
even the intentional spreading of misinformation in a research
community or the outright fabrication of results display
instances of so-called “intransigent bias” (Holman and
Bruner 2015). In a narrower sense, “industry bias” operates
more subtly, as biased researchers select research designs, data
interpretations, and ways of communicating that are more likely
to produce outcomes preferable to their industry funders.
Indeed, statistical findings on biomedical and chemical
studies indicate that industry funded studies are significantly
more likely to obtain results that serve the interests of their
funders (Davidson 1986; Barnes and Bero 1996; Barnes et al.,
2006; Schott et al., 2010; Volz and Elliott 2012; Lundh et al.,
2017). It is this latter form of industry bias which will be my
concern in what follows.
In an influential article, Torsten Wilholt has argued that the
argument from inductive risk (AIR) challenges the epistemically
detrimental nature of industry bias (Wilholt 2009). Discussions of
inductive risk, popularized by Richard Rudner and Carl Hempel,
are based on the assumption that the choice of a level of evidential
confirmation for accepting a hypothesis is epistemically
underdetermined (Rudner 1953; Hempel 1965).2 The threshold
of evidence that scientists accept as sufficient for a claim to be
confirmed displays the risk of possible inductive error that they
are willing to take. In making a risk-judgement, researchers face a
trade-off between the risk of accepting a claim that is in fact false
(false positive) and the risk of rejecting a hypothesis that is in fact
true (false negative). Based on Carl Hempel’s account, Heather
Douglas has advocated what is usually taken to be the strongest
version of AIR, which holds that if false-negatives or false-
positives entail non-epistemic consequences, scientists must
base their risk-judgements on non-epistemic values. Moreover,
Douglas argues, experiments are permeated by such decisions
about inductive risk at multiple internal stages, namely when
scientists make methodological choices about statistical
significance, qualitatively characterize their evidence, and
interpret their results. In all these steps, researchers ultimately
have to make epistemically underdetermined decisions for which
they ought to estimate the consequences of potential false
positives and false negatives based on non-epistemic values
(Douglas 2000, 577–578).
Whether Douglas’s version of AIR in fact offers a prescriptive
or solely a descriptive claim need not concern us further here, as it
is the descriptive part of her argument that motivates Wilholt’s
1The only criticism may be found in Betz (2013) and is discussed explicitly in
section “Is Methodological Conventionalism Well Motivated?”. 2For the statistical origin of inductive risk see: Wald (1942), Churchman (1948).
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risk conventionalist account of industry bias (Wilholt 2009,
94–95). He discusses two case-studies of inductive risk
decisions, which would typically be characterized as instances
of industry bias:
• Bisphenol A, which is used as a monomer in polycarbonate
plastic and has toxic effects due to its similarity to human
estrogen, was shown to be carcinogenic in many
government-funded studies. However, industry funded
experiments were continuously conducted on a strain of
laboratory rats known to be insensitive to estrogen,
effectively establishing the non-toxicity of bisphenol A
(vom Saal and Hughes 2005).
• Exposure to vinyl chloride, likewise used in the production
of polycarbonate plastics, is correlated with a rise in
mortality rates and a significant increase in liver and
brain cancer risk. The Chemical Manufacturers’
Association funded various studies based on which the
legal regulation of vinyl chloride was prevented. In one
of those studies, the famous British epidemiologist Richard
Doll dismissed a previous review that claimed to have shown
that exposure to vinyl chloride is correlated to liver and
brain cancer, and would therefore raise the risk of mortality
significantly. Doll argued that all brain cancer cases must be
excluded from the mortality risk calculation, as the link
between vinyl chloride and brain cancer was only postulated
in the very same study, thus having not gone through
independent testing (Sass et al., 2005).
Given that AIR holds, Wilholt’s argument goes, industry
biases in research on bisphenol A and vinyl chloride may be
re-interpreted as potentially justified non-epistemic value
judgements about an appropriate level of inductive risk. Both
substances, industry researchers might argue, have important
applications, as they are widely used to produce polymers for the
manufacture of pipes, medical instruments, plastic wraps or wall
covers. Non-industry researchers, thus, may in turn be accused of
accepting an unduly high risk of false positives. Therefore, the
supposedly biased laboratory rat selection and unusually high
demand for robustness could be justified in recourse to possible
non-epistemic consequences. A similar reasoning,Wilholt shows,
can be applied to justify substandard pharmaceutical trials in
which drugs are tested against placebos instead of their most
effective alternatives (Wilholt 2009, 93).
Surely, there are many ethical objections to be raised against
these non-epistemic arguments. Cancer risk may be agreed upon
to carry more ethical weight than a shortage of plastic wraps or
the use of costlier alternative polymers in medical instrument
manufacturing (Chiellini et al., 2013). Likewise, we might agree
that “public risks” are to be taken more seriously than producer
risks (Biddle and Leuschner 2015). However, given that AIR
holds, we seem to be left with the conclusion that there is no
epistemic objection to the supposedly biased research on
bisphenol A and vinyl chloride.
However, both findings were not only overturned by the
toxicological research community but were deemed to be
instances of epistemic failure. Thus, toxicologists invoked a
methodological standard that was infringed by the risk
decisions in question. Given the considerations above, such
apparent standards, and the levels of inductive risk they
implicitly or explicitly determine, need an epistemic
justification. While Wilholt thinks that there is such a
justification, he claims it cannot be grounded in classical
individualist epistemology. Rather, it emerges from the social
epistemology of scientific research. While Wilholt concedes to
AIR that we have no purely epistemic reasons to select one
specific balance of risk, he contests that methodological
standards are nonetheless needed to facilitate the trust of
researchers in each other’s results. In turn, trust is
epistemically warranted because it is required for collective
empirical success. In other words, settling on a standard is a
“problem of coordination” (Wilholt 2013, 233). Problems of
coordination are not solved by empirical evidence or
individual rationality but settled by the establishment of a
conventional equilibrium between the conflicting utilities of
agents. Even if the exact shape of that equilibrium (i.e., the
exact balance of inductive risk) cannot be determined
rationally, settling on some equilibrium maximizes the utilities
of all epistemic agents involved. Thus, following conventional
methodologies is in the interest of all researchers, as it facilitates
mutual trust. As Wilholt’s argument offers a trust-based
justification of the standards of inductive risk inherent in
conventional research methodologies, he called his view
methodological conventionalism. For a methodological
conventionalist, industry bias can be defined (and criticized) as
the “the infringement of an explicit or implicit conventional
standard of the respective research community in order to
increase the likelihood of arriving at a preferred result”
(Wilholt 2009, 99).
More recently, Wilholt has presented a more sophisticated
version of this argument that distinguishes between conventions
simpliciter and epistemic trust. Scientists rely on conventional
methodologies to avoid constant deliberations about such
implicit risk decisions as highlighted by Douglas. However,
even standardized methodologies leave leeway for active value-
judgementsto be taken by researchers. In such cases, “reliance
presupposes much more than just that other scientists work
dependably and professionally in keeping with the rules of the
trade. It presupposes that they have the right attitude toward what
they are doing—an attitude whose absence might be considered
not just regrettable but to a certain degree blameworthy.”
(Wilholt 2013, 249)
Wilholt’s modified view suggests that epistemic trust
characterizes a stronger kind of reliance that extends beyond
implicit standards to include active value judgements. In both
versions of his argument, however, the underlying logic remains a
conventionalist one. When considerations about non-epistemic
consequences enter methodological decision processes,
conventional standards or attitudes are needed to fix some
equilibrium in the trade-off between the risks of false positive
and false negatives. As Douglas shows convincingly that such
considerations cannot be fully eliminated in scientific research,
social coordination can only be achieved if researchers follow
methodological conventions.
Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics | www.frontiersin.org December 2020 | Volume 5 | Article 5995063
Ohnesorge The Limits of Conventional Justification
IS METHODOLOGICAL
CONVENTIONALISM WELL MOTIVATED?
So far, I have shown that methodological conventionalism is
motivated by the prevalence of non-epistemic risk decisions in
scientific research. Before discussing the conventionalist account
of bias, I will review this motivation in light of recent responses to
AIR. In principle, there are two ways of avoiding the conclusion
that the ubiquity of inductive risks in scientific research warrant
non-epistemic value judgements. One may either show that 1)
there is a non-conventional justification of a certain standard of
inductive risk or 2) that inductive risk decisions can be sufficiently
avoided by scientists.
Strategy 1) is usually based on Bayesian considerations.
Wilholt himself is concerned with this, discussing Isaac Levi’s
objection to the mid-20th century variant of AIR (Levi 1962). Levi
argued that to have a long run approximation of the value of our
priors toward de facto truth (Pr [H]  1) or falsity (Pr [¬H]  1) of
hypotheses, there is a purely epistemic demand to have a fixed
identical threshold L for the acceptance of the truth or falsity of a
claim, outlawing any trade-offs. However, this oversimplifies the
aims of scientific activities, as researchers are not simply looking
for true claims. Indeed, there is a nearly infinite amount of
arbitrary truths that are scientifically uninteresting. Instead,
they are looking for true claims that are significant relative to
broader epistemic goals. Even in “basic research” such epistemic
significance is indicated by certain epistemic values such as
fruitfulness, explanatory scope, or predictive accuracy. Between
different epistemic aims or values, however, there can exist
context-dependent or systematic trade-offs, casting doubt on
the practical realizability of a generally fixed L-value (Kuhn
1977; Longino 1996, 44). Instead, an ideal researcher can, at
best, follow a utility matrix that prioritizes communicating the
truth (i.e., genuinely true or genuinely false claims) over refusing
communication or miscommunicating. Such a “weak”
commitment to truth, however, leaves leeway to significant
trade-offs and consequently does not serve to rationally set
appropriate standards of inductive risk.
After Wilholt’s first conventionalist proposal, however,
philosophers have scrutinized whether inductive risk might
not be sufficiently avoidable after all, thus opting for strategy
2). Such arguments defend the operability of what has been called
the value-free ideal (VFI). VFI can be defined as the demand that
“the justification of scientific findings should not be based on
non-epistemic (e.g., moral or political) values” (Betz 2013, 208). If
the operability of VFI can be rescued, one might think, the
motivation of risk conventionalism collapses, as any industry
preferences can be identified as non-epistemic intrusions.
The most influential recent argument for VFI was put forward
by Gregor Betz, explicitly targeting, among other views, Wilholt’s
adherence to a variant of AIR (Betz 2013, 208). While conceding
that the inductive risk in making binary judgements about
accepting or rejecting a hypothesis cannot be eliminated, he
denies that scientists must make judgements of that form.
Instead of acceptance/rejection assertions, scientists can qualify
their results by stating all instances of inductive risk in their
research. For example, they may hedge their claims by elucidating
the statistical certainty or significance of their findings (e.g., x is
correct “with a certainty of 95%” or x is significant “to a p-value of
0.04”). Likewise, they may modalize or conditionalize their
conclusions more generally (e.g., “it is possible/unlikely/
plausible” that x is correct or “if we admit a possible error of
y/a model organism z,” x is correct). While one may contest that
every hedged claim comes with second-order risk as
“probabilistic hypotheses are just as open to inductive risks as
others” (Brown 2013, 834; Douglas 2009, 85), it is not clear
whether this actually poses a threat for Betz’s defense of the VFI.
His argument does not aim to show that inductive claims can be
completely free of risk, but qualified “beyond reasonable doubt.”
If he is correct about this, scientists may avoid the impact of non-
epistemic considerations on their results by acknowledging and
stating the risks of their inductive inferences in form of
probabilistic, modal, or conditional claims. Contra Wilholt,
industry bias may, on this account, be identified as
epistemically detrimental if it inhibits the proper
communication and/or minimization of inductive risks (Betz
2013, 216).
For Betz’s proposal to have any bearing on Wilholt’s use of
AIR, it needs to be shown that it can in fact be operationalized
successfully to avoid value-judgements and thus offers an
operable epistemic standard against which industry biases can
be assessed. However, the validity of Betz’s own example for value
freedom in action, the Guidance Note for a consistent treatment of
uncertainties by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) (Mastrandrea et al., 2011), has been strongly contested.
The Guidance Note tries to map inductive risk based on “states of
scientific understanding,” by reference to which scientists
involved in a global evaluation of climate research are
supposed to qualify their findings. However, as Katie Steele
has argued based on an older IPCC report, such confidence
scales (e.g., range of 1–10, intervals of 1) are too coarse-
grained to properly communicate inductive risks. This
situation is complicated further by the underdetermined
classifying of some of those intervals as displaying “high,”
low,” or “medium” confidence (Steele 2012). The problem of
applying Betz’s hedging principle is not limited to the case
considered by Steele, but persist within the newer IPCC
reports (Steel 2016; Frisch 2020). Moreover, Stephen John has
shown that the IPCC even commits to inductive risk judgements
by including or excluding peer-reviewed papers. In its fourth
report, scientists refrained from making a prediction regarding
the melting of the West Antarctic Ice Shield because they
excluded a study not yet gone through peer-review (O’Reilly
et al., 2012; John 2015, 7).
Beyond its lack of applicability to the IPCC-case, however,
John argues that a modest version of the VFI (VFImodest in what
follows) can be rescued from Betz’s proposal. It seems that the
idea of hedging claims is a fruitful one in principle, as it decreases
inductive risks. He proposes that hedging claims “beyond
reasonable doubt” is enough to consolidate VFImodest, even if
it is less reliable in eliminating non-epistemic value judgements
than Betz concedes. Reformulating Duncan Pritchard’s
epistemic-safety definition of knowledge, John argues that
“knowledge” itself can be roughly defined as our body of
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claims that are true beyond reasonable doubt. If scientists hedge
their claims beyond reasonable doubt, they thus pursue a purely
epistemic aim, namely genuine knowledge (Pritchard 2005; John
2015, 163). One problem for VFImodest approximates canonical
issues around Popperian testability. The history of science gives
evidence that proliferating doubtful hypotheses, contrary to
norms of epistemic caution, can be epistemically beneficial in
the long run (Lakatos 1999; Feyerabend 2002; Chang 2014, ch.2).
Thus, scientists have, in certain cases, purely epistemic reasons for
not following VFImodest. Beyond such broader issues, VFImodest
certainly does not offer an epistemic standard strong enough to
criticize the cases of industry bias that Wilholt discusses. Richard
Doll dismissed the health hazards of vinyl chloride precisely by
appealing to epistemic caution (Wilholt 2009, 93). Thus, the
adherent of VFImodest will continue to be puzzled by the actions of
the toxicological community which not only overturned Doll’s
research findings, but retrospectively deemed their initial
acceptance an instance of epistemic failure (Sass et al., 2005).
THE PROBLEM OF FLAWED
CONVENTIONS
I have argued that the motivation of methodological
conventionalism by appeal to inductive risk decisions in
various stages of scientific research is robust in light of
recent criticism of AIR. Remember that Wilholt further
intends his position to justify epistemic criticisms of
industry bias as “the infringement of an explicit or implicit
conventional standard of the respective research community in
order to increase the likelihood of arriving at a preferred
result” (Wilholt 2009, 99). Some of the most strongly voiced
criticism of industry influence on scientific research, however,
does not target infringements on methodological conventions,
but explicitly points to flaws in such conventions. For example,
a recent collaborative article in the British Medical Journal
states:
“Sponsoring companies have obvious financial incentives to
overstate product benefits and downplay harms. But these
incentives are enabled by our imperfect methods of evaluation,
which can be exploited in myriad ways, consciously or
unconsciously, at all stages of the process.” (Moynihan et al.,
2019, 2).
To better understand the implications of flawed standards for
methodological conventionalism, let us look at an illustrative
example: pharmaceutical drug trials involving human subjects.
As Jacob Stegenga has argued at length, the current organization
of the system of randomized controlled drug trials (RCTs)
hinders the detection of harms. RCT testing is split up in
three separate phases (P1-P3). Only drugs that were successful
(i.e., harm-free) in P1 successively enter P2 and P3 trials. However,
an estimated 95% of P1 results remain unpublished by the
pharmaceutical companies owning the studies’ publishing
rights (Decullier et al., 2009). Thereby, Stegenga argues,
relevant evidence about the harmfulness of the tested
molecules, the broader classes of molecule they belong to, as
well as medical drugs overall is lost:
“Any tested molecule x is a member of the class of molecules of
type T, and this class is itself a member of the class of all drugs D.
Evidence from a phase 1 trial on x is relevant, obviously, to the
harm profile of x, but is also relevant to the harm profile of T
(albeit more indirectly), and is also relevant to the harm profile of
D (more indirectly still).” (Stegenga 2018, 138).
The unavailability of a majority of the evidence about the
harms of x, T, andD constrains the reference class based on which
the prior probabilities for harmful effects in future drug trials are
determined. More formally: the conditional probability Pr(K|E)
of x being harmful in a future P1, P2, or P3 trial, where K is the
hypothesis that x is harmful and E the relevant new evidence, will
always be unduly low due to the constrained reference class of K.
Moreover, due to the constrained evidence about the harm profile
of T and D, the value of prior probabilities in future trials
involving molecules of the same class as x, and, in a less
significant manner, any other molecule, will decrease. Overall,
the prevalence of harms of any specific drug and of
pharmaceuticals in general can therefore be expected to be
way higher were it not for the withholding of evidence from
P1 trials (Stegenga 2018, 138–139). Stegenga identifies an
apparent trade-off between two forms of statistical power,
where “statistical power” refers to “the sensitivity of a trial to
detect an effect of the intervention under investigation, when
there is such an effect to be detected” (Stegenga 2018, 141).
Statistical power is a function of a trial’s effect size, the number of
subjects under investigations, and the variability of the data. In
the case of P1, P2, and P3 statistical trials, the powerH to detect
harms partially trades-off with the powerB to detect benefits
of drugs.
It is possible to directly connect the RCT case to Wilholt’s
AIR-based line of reasoning. In fact, one can easily recast the
choice of a balance between the two types of statistical power as a
choice of a standard of inductive risk. If powerH increases, we face
a higher risk of false positives (harmless drugs that are wrongly
assessed to be harmful), if powerB increases, we face a higher risk
of false negatives (harmful drugs that were wrongly assessed to be
harmless). Now, with a bit of counterfactual reasoning, it is
possible criticize the empirical performance of the current
standard of inductive risk while avoiding an ethical judgment
about the appropriate balance of risks. Consider the possibility of
publishing more P1 results. As a consequence, the absolute power
to detect harms in RCT system will increase without decreasing
the absolute power to detect benefits. While the relative balance
between powerH and powerB tips toward powerH, our
methodological decision would not decrease the ability of
pharmaceutical drug trials to detect beneficial drugs. The
changes in the standard of inductive risk are not the result of
weighing ethical consequences, nor solely of changing
coordinative conventions. If all P1 results were to be
published, we would improve the empirical performance of the
research methodology in question. The currently operative
conventional standard of risk in the pharmaceutical RCTs, it
follows, has been empirically ineffective.
Now, methodological conventionalism only licenses epistemic
criticism of those preference-based decisions that infringe on
conventional standards of inductive risk. The testing for harms by
Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics | www.frontiersin.org December 2020 | Volume 5 | Article 5995065
Ohnesorge The Limits of Conventional Justification
pharmaceutical companies, however, does not infringe on the
current conventions but exploits and perpetuates their inherent
flaws. As a consequence, it does not qualify as being biased in the
way defined earlier. In fact, Wilholt admits “that it might be
claimed that sometimes the conventional standards of a research
community are themselves distorted by interests and preferences
in an epistemologically problematic way” (Wilholt 2009, 2). If all
that would be at stake is the adequate domain for the definition of
bias as infringements on conventions, such a disclaimer might
suffice to avoid the problem. We could simply exempt flawed
conventions from our definition of industry bias and treat them
as a separate kind of epistemic problem. Methodological
conventionalism, however, goes beyond a conventional
concept of bias, as it aims to offer a general account of the
justification of standards of inductive risk. The RCT case offers a
counterexample to such a view as it illustrates that inductive risk
equilibria that are set by conventionally accepted methodologies
can be epistemically criticized beyond their ability to facilitate
coordination. As it stands, conventionalists appear to be unable of
accounting for the purely empirical target of such criticism even if
we (quite artificially) separate them from the problem of
industry bias.
Wilholt himself seems aware of the problem, as he offers a
reworked account of conventionality in a 2016 paper, which
appears to be more promising regarding its ability to deal with
the problem of flawed conventions (Wilholt 2016). There, he
argues that discussions of AIR have unduly neglected the rate
at which varying methodological conventions lead researchers
to empirical results. While inductive risk judgements are
generally taken to involve a trade-off between the
reliabilities of negative and positive results, Wilholt now
takes them to involve an additional third dimension (see
also: Steel 2016). He characterized the latter as a method’s
“power”, defined as the rate at which it “generates definitive
results, given a certain amount of effort” (Wilholt 2016, 227)
Hence, what is desirable in a method of inquiry (from an
epistemic perspective) can only be captured by considering all
three dimensions: the reliability of positive results, the
reliability of negative results, and the method’s power. For
each method, these three magnitudes form a triple that I will
call the inquiry’s distribution of inductive risks (Wilholt
2016, 227).
Thus, the adoption of methodological standards is not
solely coordinating the risks involved in positive and
negative reliability but is likewise constrained by its
function in delivering new findings. Could a methodological
conventionalist, then, account for cases like the RCT system by
invoking changes in such three-dimensional distributions of
inductive risks? I do not think so. While Wilholt’s focus on
inquiries’ absolute power correctly acknowledges that different
conventional standards of inductive risk do vary in their
empirical effectiveness, he does not concede that the latter
can be improved without sacrificing the reliability of positive
or negative results:
“The three dimensions of the vector are antagonistic to each
other in the sense that each of them alone can easily be increased
at the cost of one or both of the others, so that any methodological
choice involves a trade-off between the three dimensions.”
(Wilholt 2016, 228) (my italics).
In light of the above discussion, the claim that “any
methodological choice” trades-off against positive and negative
reliability of standards of methodologies seems incorrect. In fact,
it appears to be possible to increase the RCT system’s ability to 1)
deliver empirical results and 2) to avoid false negatives, without
thereby decreasing its ability to avoid false positives. By not
acknowledging the possibility of such empirical improvements,
methodological conventionalism fails to license a robust criticism
of empirically ineffective conventions and so does not offer
sufficient grounds to discuss the epistemic dangers of industry
funded science.
CONVENTIONS AND EMPIRICAL
CRITICISM
The problem of flawed conventions indicates the shortcomings
of methodological conventionalism. As an account of the
justification of methodologies choices, it does not license
criticisms of purely empirical (as opposed to coordinative)
flaws in conventionally justified standards of inductive risk. In
what follows, I want to propose an alternative account, dubbed
permissive empiricism. My proposal constructively departs from
methodological conventionalism by introducing a more
sophisticated account of conventionality in science. In doing
so, I aim to preserve the merits of Wilholt’s focus on the role of
conventions in discussing inductive risk decisions and
identifying industry bias. In fact, I hope that the position that
I will develop can offer a two-fold constructive improvement on
methodological conventionalism’s theoretical and practical
weaknesses. Theoretically, I hope to offer a more
sophisticated analysis of conventionality that aligns Wilholt’s
insights with an uncontroversial empiricism. Practically, my
position should offer a more powerful framework to identify
instances of industry bias.
Recall that Wilholt understands the choice of standards of
inductive risk as a “problem of coordination” (Wilholt 2013, 233).
If scientists do not trust each other to take similar risks in their
research, the research community’s coordination suffers, which
negatively impacts its overall epistemic success. Thus, it is
epistemically warranted that the risk decisions of “information
producers [. . .] and information users [in the research
community] are (approximately) the same” (Wilholt 2013,
248). As the RCT case in section four shows, this leaves the
balance of inductive risk 1) a matter of convention, and, therefore,
2) not liable to direct empirical criticism. Although I agree with
Wilholt that methodological standards of inductive risk can be
justified in virtue of their conventional function in facilitating
coordination, I will argue that 2) does not follow, as conventions
are not immune to empirical criticism. In fact, scientist ought to
aim at providing such criticism to avoid perpetuating empirically
ineffective conventions.
The long history of conventionality in the philosophy of
science offers a good starting point to understand how
standards of inductive risk can be subjected to empirical
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criticism. Ernst Mach originally introduced the problem of
coordination in a discussion of thermometric intervals. As
thermometric intervals are given as a function of the
expansion rate of a thermoscopic substance, he argued, we
ought to choose a substance expanding as uniformly with
increasing temperature as possible. However, “uniformity of
expansion” presumes the thermometric scale we want to
define, given that we have no scale-independent possibility of
operationalizing “temperature”. Thus, we face an undetermined
decision between different standards of measurement which will
all fulfill a conventional purpose of facilitating coordination
(Mach and McGuiness, 1986, 52). Such problems seem to
require different responses than the decisions typically faced
by scientists. Generally, we would want scientists to choose
explanations, theories, or methods based on some form of
available or expected empirical evidence. When mid-
nineteenth century physicists chose whether to base the
thermometric intervals on the expansion rates of mercury, air,
or alcohol, however, they had no reason to think that any one of
those would perform better empirically, i.e., record more
accurately the changes in absolute temperature.3 If chosen as
standard, each thermoscopic substance would simplify certain
kinds of measurement situations while making others more
complicated. By side-stepping this underdetermined choice
and agreeing on some standard, however, physicists could
establish an equilibrium between those partially conflicting
utilities.4 Thereby, they did not settle conclusively the scientific
problem of mapping “temperature” onto the physical world, but
epistemically improved the social pursuit of temperature research.
Acknowledging that some aspects scientific practice involve
conventionality in the above sense, however, is widely accepted
and does not yet ground a conventionalism. As David Lewis
points out, conventionalism entails some additional beliefs about
the power of conventions. Thus, subscribing to a conventionalism
about a goal-oriented social practice x, expresses a view about the
extent to which the organization of x is settled by coordinative
equilibria–as opposed to appeals to empirical evidence (Lewis
1969, 4). Thus, if we agree with Wilholt that scientists can avoid
making inductive risk decisions by following methodological
conventions, it remains open how far-reaching the
implications of that insight are. Flawed standards as in the
RCT-case discussed above, in particular, force us to evaluate
the degree to which standards of inductive risk remain a matter of
social coordination and to which degree the methodologies by
which they are entailed can be criticized empirically. Here, a
return to the well-studied role of conventionality in thermometry
proves insightful. As Hasok Chang notes in his canonical study
on the subject, thermoscopic substances were only chosen for
conventional reasons initially, yet meticulously tested on
variations against each other afterward (Chang 2004, 59). That
is, although first attempts at standardization were based on
conventional decisions, thermometric standards could
eventually be subjected to comparative empirical scrutiny. In
the long run, the relative performance of alternative ways of
standardizing temperature (i.e. in reference to different
thermoscopic substances) could be compared based on the
substances’ relative performance. While choices of
measurement standards were thus based on both their
conventional ability to facilitate coordination and their
empirical success, the power of conventionality in such choices
decreased over time. Thus, a conventional judgment about the
fixation of a coordinative equilibrium successively made room for
a growing body of empirical evidence.
Now recall the case of harm detection in RCTs. On the
conventionalist account, a standardization of inductive risk, i.e.
a fixed balance between powerH and powerB, is epistemically
warranted and the methodological choices constituting that
standard can be justified in virtue of their conventionality.
However, I take Stegenga’s analysis to show that a
modification of the current methodological conventions
promises to be epistemically beneficial. Thus, if we require the
publishing of all P1 results, thereby modifying the standard of
risk, we can expect more empirical success in the actual detection
of harms without decreasing the trials’ capacity to detect benefits.
In line with the temperature analogy above, the performance of
the current standard can be epistemically assessed based on its
comparative empirical success. Of course, there is a crucial
difference between the two examples. In the case of
thermometry, physicists were able to conduct a comparative
evaluation of alternative conventions based on their actual
empirical success, whereas epistemic criticism of the current
RCT system is based on counterfactual reasoning. Both,
however, indicate that strongly conventional methodological
decisions can, be subjected to empirical criticism, at a later
stage. Such criticism does not consist of a weighing of
inductive risks, but of an analysis of the empirical
performance of the operative methodological conventions that
set the respective standards of risk.
Given these examples as well as Lewis’s distinction between
conventionality and conventionalism, my worry about the
unwarranted implications of Wilholt’s proposal can be stated
more succinctly. In scientific practice, conventionally justified
methodological choices often qualify for empirical criticism (or
justification) at a later stage of research. If scientists can limit
conventionality by extending the scope of empirical scrutiny, they
ought to do so. While Wilholt’s notion of bias as preference-based
infringements on methodological conventions offers an
important epistemological criticism, caution is needed before
generalizing it into an “-ism” of any sort. Standards of
inductive risks that are determined by conventional
methodologies are epistemically necessary and should be
defended against preference-based infringements. However,
pace Wilholt, coordination offers merely a preliminary form of
justification, which should be substituted by empirical arguments
wherever possible. In theory, such arguments may consist of
counterfactual criticism (as offered by Stegenga in the RCT case),
or even become actualized in comparisons of empirical
performance (as in the thermometry example).
3This is, of course, at best an oversimplification of the complicated history of
thermometry, which merely serves to illustrate, not to substantiate, Mach’s
argument.
4This framing in terms of equilibria stems from Lewis, (1969).
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TOWARD A PERMISSIVE EMPIRICISM
I have argued that methodological conventionalism cannot
adequately address the problem of flawed methodological
standards and even runs the risk of providing them with a
justification in terms of their conventional utility. I have
traced the cause of that problem to an insufficient analysis of
scientific conventionality. While scientists avoid inductive risk
decisions by following methodologies that are not justified
empirically but in terms of their coordinative function, such
conventional justifications are merely preliminary. In scientific
practice, conventional methodological choices can be subjected to
posterior criticism by comparing their respective empirical
performance. In such processes, conventional justification is
substituted by empirical justification. By stressing that such
substitutions are warranted, we can avoid the problem of
flawed conventions.
Given these qualifications, we can preserve Wilholt’s insights
in a straight-forward and, I hope, uncontroversial empiricist
position. All the standard empiricist has to concede is that
standards of inductive risks can be provisionally justified in
virtue of their coordinative function. Such a proviso accounts
for practical constraints that are an ineliminable element of
scientific practice, like a shortage of information about a new
domain of inquiry or a lack of financial or instrumental resources.
As Wilholt has shown convincingly, socio-epistemic
coordination warrants some standard. However, conventional
justifications should, in principle, be regarded as merely
preliminary. As such, they ought to be subjected to posterior
empirical criticism. To illustrate this in another case, take
Wilholt’s own example of toxicological research into the
health risks of exposure to bisphenol A. The selection of
model organisms for testing bisphenol A, of course, comes
with non-epistemic risks due to the potential health hazards
that missing legal restrictions would cause to humans. A
conventionalist would now object (epistemically) to the
preference-based choice of a specific rat strain outside of a
conventional class of model organisms. However, we can also
make a straight-forward empirical argument about the
comparative suitability of the different rat strains available. If
the toxicity of bisphenol A is linked to its similarity to estrogen, an
estrogen-insensitive rat strain will have smaller relative empirical
success in detecting the potential harms of exposure to humans.
Thus, not only did industry research infringe on the toxicological
conventions, but it negatively impacted their empirical
performance. While the former criticism identifies
epistemically detrimental effects on the collective coordination
of inquiry, the latter would show how one particular (potential)
standard is empirically ineffective. I concede that, in this case, the
empirical criticism does not target a methodological convention. I
hope, however, that it sufficiently illustrates the relevant
difference. Afterall, the same argument applies if the
conventional class of model organisms (instead of the
organism used in a particular experiment) would be composed
of estrogen-insensitive rats.
In the debates on value-freedom and inductive risk, such a
permissive variant of empiricism offers a compromise between
methodological conventionalism and the VFI. In line with the
former, it asserts that most inductive risk judgements are not
made by individual scientists, but are settled implicitly by
conventionally justified standards. Thus, conventional
justification may only be accepted if ignorance or financial
and experimental constrains keep us from testing the relative
empirical performance of different standards of inductive risk.5 In
line with defenders of the VFI, however, permissive empiricism
maintains that an effective elimination of non-epistemic risk
decisions is generally warranted. This normative aim, however,
is not achieved through specific forms of communication, but by
means of posterior empirical criticism of conventional standards.
If the reader has followedmy arguments this far, she might still
find my alternative somewhat less elegant than either the 1) VFI
or 2) methodological conventionalism. I concede that both offer a
simpler response to the problem of inductive risk and, moreover,
a single accompanying strategy to identify epistemically
detrimental bias. I hope to have shown, however, that both
run into serious difficulties, as they are either 1) practically
inoperable or 2) implicitly allow for the justification of flawed
standards. Beyond these negative arguments, moreover, the
inconvenience introduced by a permissive empiricism is
smaller than it might appear on first sight. While it permits
not one but two kinds of justifications for standards of inductive
risk (conventional and empirical), neither of them is grounded in
any particularly uncomfortable or even novel epistemological
claim. They simply pay tribute to the fact that scientific inquiry
has a social and an empirical dimension. As such, research needs
both 1) effective organization (i.e., coordination qua conventions)
and 2) sensibility to the behavior of its corresponding target-
systems (i.e., empirical utility). It should not be too controversial
to regard arguments pertaining to 2) as the stronger form of
justification or criticism. After all, corresponding to these two
dimensions, we found industry influence to have two forms of
epistemically detrimental consequences. Financial incentives
infringe on the necessary conventions of a field or perpetuate
empirically ineffective conventions in that field. The former
epistemic danger is captured by industry bias in Wilholt’s
sense, while the latter might be dubbed structural industry
bias, as it is the result of structurally flawed standards.
CONCLUSION
I have offered a criticism of methodological conventionalism.
Wilholt’s proposal is an important intervention in both the
debates on value-freedom and industry bias. Not only does it
highlight the neglected role of social conventions in handling
inductive risk, but its definition of bias as preference-based
infringements of conventional standards licenses criticisms of
a crucial epistemic danger in industry funded science. However, I
have argued that it suffers from a theoretical and a resulting
practical weakness. Theoretically, it offers an underdeveloped
5Such as the interpretation of autopsy slides of laboratory rats in dioxin cancer
studies discussed in Douglas (2000), 569–570.
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analysis of scientific conventions, which fails to highlight how
scientists are able to eliminate conventionality through posterior
empirical criticism. Pure coordination problems that are
confronted by settling a conventional equilibrium often
become solvable on the basis of empirical evidence at a later
stage of research. In such processes, a weaker type of justification
and criticism is substituted by a stronger alternative. Practically,
the neglect of this facet of conventionality makes methodological
conventionalism unsuited to deal with what I dubbed the
problem of flawed conventions. Some of the epistemically
most detrimental consequences of industry preferences are not
infringements on conventions, but the institution or perpetuation
of empirically ineffective conventions.
In a constructive departure from methodological
conventionalism, I tried to offer an account that preserves its
insights while including a more qualified notion of
conventionality. Permissive empiricism, as I dubbed it, is the
following two-partite view on the justification of standards of
inductive risk. Methodological choices that determine certain
balances of inductive risk can be provisionally justified in virtue
of their conventional function in setting coordinative equilibria. Such
justifications, however, are merely preliminary, as they ought to be
substituted by empirical arguments. Thus, if not blocked by financial,
experimental, or other constrains, conventions should be evaluated
based on their comparative empirical success.
Corresponding to the two kinds of epistemic justification
invoked above, my empiricist framework licenses two kinds of
criticisms of industry bias. The first has been exhaustively
characterized by Wilholt and targets preference-based
infringement on conventional standards of inductive risk. I
proposed structural industry bias as a name for the additional
type of bias I introduced. Structural industry bias occurs if
industry influence perpetuates or institutes conventional
standards that are empirically ineffective. Identifying and
criticizing this second kind of bias is crucial for any evaluation
of the dangers of industry funded science. As Stegenga’s case
against the current RCT-system illustrates, such criticism is not
an idle epistemological worry, but has direct relevance for the
epistemic integrity of scientific research. Attention to structural
industry bias, is thus of central importance for the successful
regulation of industry funded research.
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